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ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue before the Court is whether, in light of several relevailt factors, Ring v. Arizona 
536 U.S. 584 (2002), should be applied retroactively. The answer to this question must take into 
account the law of retroactivity in Idaho, what test the Court uses to determine whether a new 
rule should he retroactively applied, and what outcome application of that test would have when 
applied to Ring. In light of Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1041-42 (2008), this Court 
should explore whether Idaho's long established three factor retroactivity test (the "Linklettev 
test"') should be employed to determine whether Riizg should be applied to collateral review 
cases or, alternatively, whether there is sufficient cause to override stare decisis by rejecting the 
Linkletter test in favor of that adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
By contrast, the State explicitly seeks to rephrase the issue, transforming it into whether 
this appeal must be dismissed ibr lack ofjurisdiction, then spends well over half its arguinent lo 
trying to persuade the Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Brief Of Respondent 
("Respondent's Brief') at 6,7-23. The State's asserted proper standard of review-"'this Court 
should. . .directly address the motion, detemline whether or not the requirements of section 19- 
2719 have been met, and rule accordingly""-reflects the State's effort to refocus the Court from 
whether Ring should he applied retroactively to whether this case should he dismissed for want 
of jurisdiction. The State characterizes the issue and standard of review exclusively in terms of 
'Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,622-23 (1965) 
'Respondent's Brief at 8 (quoting Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 5 1, 55, 156 P.3d 552 
(2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573,575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded on othev 
grounds Hairston v. Idaho, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008)) 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719, notwithstanding Petitioner's state and federal constitutionally 
based arguments regarding retroactivity doctrine, the fundamental right to a j u ~ y  trial, and equal 
protection and due process guarantees. 
The State's blindered approach to the issue before the Court is reflected throughout its 
brief, most notably, perhaps, where it characterizes Petitioner's arguments as an effort "to skirt 
[his] conviction[] or death sentence[] based upon a new technicality[.]" Respondent's Brief at 14. 
To characterize the fundamental right to a jury trial as a "technicality" trivializes our 
constitutional rights into a collection of obstacles without any appreciation for how denying those 
rights to criminal defendants threatens not merely criminal defendants but citizens and their 
relationship to their government. By serving as "'jurors actual or possible[,]"' ordinary citizens 
can prevent the july system's "'arbitra~y use or abuse."' Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406 
(1991) (quoting Balzuc v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)). 
The State makes three arguments which this brief addresses. First, the State contends that 
Idaho's legislature has removed from its courts the jurisdiction to entertain any successive post- 
convictio~l claims which are based on the retroactive application of new rules of law. 
Respondent's Brief at 7-23. For this reason, the State asserts, the Court has properly never 
reached the question of what test should be used to determine what retroactive application a new 
mle of law should be given, if any, in a successive capital post-conviction case. Second, 
contendiilg that the three-factor Linkletteu retroactivity test is difficult to apply and causes 
inconsistent results, the State argues that the Court should adopt the federal retroactivity test (the 
"Teague test") which the federal courts developed to address concerns not present in state court 
systems-the need for comity and respect for finality of state court convictions in our federalist 
system. Respondent's Brief at 24-27. Third, the State asserts that Ring is not retroactively 
applicable under the Linkletter test. Id. at 28-31. Fourth, the State contends that fundamental 
fairness does not mandate the retroactive application of Ring. Id. at 3 1-33 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER IDAHO'S RETROACTIVITY TEST, RING SHOULD BE GIVEN 
RETROACTIVE EFFECT IN THIS CASE. 
The State contends that this Court has implicitly rejected the Linkletter test in favor of 
what it calls the "GrifSitlz test," under which new decisional rules of law apply only to those 
cases not final at the time the new case is decided. Respondent's Brief at 15. However, the State 
argues, alternatively, that under the quasi-Grifjith test3, Ring should not be applied retroactively 
to cases on collateral review 
A. Liizkletter Is Idaho's Long-Established Retroactivity Test For Determining 
Whether A New Decisiolial Rule Should Be Applied To Cases On Collateral 
Review. 
When this Court first addressed the question of retroactivity, it adopted the three factor 
test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Linkletter. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 
19,25, 523 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1974). There, the Court held: 
Three different approaches to retroactivity can be identified. The first approach is 
the traditioi~al rule . . . [and under it] a decision [is] applicable to both past and 
future cases. [Under] [tlhe second approach[, the prospective rule approach,] . . . a 
'The term "quasi-GrifJith" is used deliberately. The Court has stated that the United 
States Supreme Court developed the latter test in Grf j th  v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,419,825 P.2d 1073,1075, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1992). While 
GvifJith held that new rules applied to all non-final cases, it did not address the applicability of 
new rules in collateral review cases. Thus, Griffith did not support the Fetterly holding 
prohibiting the retroactive application of new rules to collateral review cases. 
decision is effective only in future actions, and does not affect the rule of law in 
the case in which the new rule is announced. Under the [third approach, the] 
modified prospective rule, the new decision applies prospectively and to the 
parties bringing the action resulting in the new decision; or, to the parties bringing 
the action and all similar pending actions. 
To aid the courts in determining which rule to apply, Linlcletter v. Wallcer set forth 
the following factors to be considered. First, the purpose of the new decision must 
be analyzed in connection with the question of retroactivity. . . . The second factor 
is reliance on the prior rule of law. . . . The third factor is the effect on the 
administration ofjustice. This factor takes into account the number of cases that 
would be reopened if the decision . . . is applied retroactively. 
Thompson. See also Sims v. State, 94 Idaho 801,498 P.2d 1274 (1972) ("In Linlcletter v. Wallcer, 
the Supreme Court of the United States said regarding prospective ove~~ulings: 'Tht~s, the 
accepted rule today is that in appropriate cases the court may in the interest of justice ~nalte the 
rule prospective.'") (quoting Linkletter at 628). 
The State does not contest that the Court adopted the Linkletter test, nor does it dispute 
the Court's continued use of that test. Instead, in the course of asserting that Idaho Code Section 
19-2719(5)4 precludes the courts fr01-n entertaining on their merits successive capital post- 
conviction claims which rely on the retroactive application of new rules, the State appears to 
argue that the Court carved out capital post-conviction cases as an exception to that test's 
universal applicability. Respondent's Brief at 14-1 8 
For stare decisis purposes, what matters is the retroactivity analysis which the Court has 
in fact employed. Fetterly and the remaining cases the State cites unquestionably departed from 
the Court's earlier consistent application of the Linkletter test. However, the Court decisions in 
4Througl~out this brief, references to Section 19-2719(5) are to the initial paragraph of 
that statute section as opposed to its subsections (5)(a), (b), or (c). References to those particular 
subsections are specific, e.g., Section 19-2719(5)(c). 
4 
which the Linklettev test is e~nployed to determine the retroactive effect of new rules booltend 
Fettevly and the other cases on which the State relies. Further, as of the 1990, the Court had been 
relying on the Linkletter test since 1974. 
The State contends that in Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073, velz 'g denied 
(1992), the Court utilized a quasi-Griffith bright line of finality test to deny relief. It is true that 
Justice Bistline dissented from the majority on, among other things, its retroactivity analysis. He 
wrote: 
There are three problems with this analysis: I)  G r f i t h  does not stand for the 
proposition stated by the majority, 2) this Court has never adopted Griffith as the 
law, nor is it required to fully adopt that case, and 3) under Idaho's cull-ent 
retroactivity doctrine, Chavboneau is fully retroactive. 
Fettevly, 121 Idaho at 420, 825 P.2d at 1076 (Bistline J., dissenting). The State contends that 
"the majority rejected Justice Bistline's position when it relied upon I.C. $19-2719(5) and 
Griffith, concluding, 'the Chavboneau interpretation of I.C. 519-2515 does not apply to the 
present case because the present case was final prior to the issuance of Charboneau."' 
Respondent's Brief at 16. The State's assertion that the majority "rejected Justice Bistline's 
position" in his dissenting opinion is sheer speculation grounded in its wrongly equating the 
majority's silence regarding Justice Bistline's position with its rejection of that position. The 
structure of the State's argume~lt-that this Court's overruling the application of the long 
established Linkletter test to determine the retroactive effect of a new ~ u l e  is revealed by a 
comparison between the majority opinion and Justice Bistline's dissent-makes little sense, and 
other courts have rejected this argument as unsound. One possible reason why the majority may 
not have rejected Justice Bistline's position is that the parties may not have raised the issue. 
Another is that the parties may have raise the issue only as a matter of federal and not state law. 
Tn any event, silence callnot properly be equated with rejection. United States v. Sterling, 283 
F.3d 216,219 (4"' Cir. 2002) ("overruling by implication is not favored"); see also In re 
Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1999) ("arguing that a precedent has been ovenxled 
through a court's silence is a disfavored enterprise"). 
Beyond the structure of the State's argument, its substance is counter to this Court's 
holdings on stare decisis. This Court consistently holds that "'a question once deliberately 
exanlined and decided should be considered settled."' Ultrawell, Iizc. v. Washington Mut. Ba~zk, 
FSB, 135 Idaho 832,835,25 P.3d 855,858 (2001) (quoting Scott v. Gossett, 66 Idaho 329,335, 
158 P.2d 804, 807 (1945). Thus, if the Fetterly majority believed it was shifting course from the 
settled law that the retroactivity of a new rule of law was to be determined by application of the 
Linlcletter test, it would have provided additional deliberate examination and a reasoned decision. 
The absence of reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho 
retroactivity test. 
Further, while there can be no question that the Fetterly retroactivity analysis is 
incoilsisteilt with the Linkletter test employed from the 1970s until that point (and after that point 
as well, both in the 1990s and later), the Court's intention is unclear. Whatever the court's 
intention at the time, however, it is now clear that Fetterly's use of the bright line of finality test 
was an anomaly limited to the 1990s. See infra at 9-1 1. 
In addition to Fetterly, the Slate cites four other cases as support for its position that the 
Court has excepted successive post-conviction cases from the Linkletter test. Respondent's Brief 
at 16-17. Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996); Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899, 
935 P.2d 162 (1997); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,825 P.2d 1081, reh 'g denied (1992); State 1). 
Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991). As with Fetterly, none of these four additional 
cases supports the State's contention. 
In only two of the State's five cases, Fetterly and Butler, did the Court plainly state that it 
was applying the quasi-Grlffith bright line of finality Fetterly has been discussed above 
Stuart, the only language relevant to the issue is dicta, and even it fails to support the 
State's position. Stuart was an appeal born the denial of Mr. Stuart's motion pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 60(b)(5). The Court affirmed that denial on the basis of substantive 
law, not on the basis of Section 19-2719(5) analysis. Stuart at 437-38, 934-35. In the relevant 
dicta, the Court noted that even if the substantive law had favored Mr. Stuart, he still would have 
lost because it was announced in a case released after his conviction was final: this "fact. . .would 
preclude retroactive application. See Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-19, 825 P.2d 1073, 
1074-75 (1991), cert. den. 506 U.S. 1002 (1992) (holding new decision on death penalty 
sentencing did not apply retroactively to already final cases)." Stuart at 438, 935. The Court 
supplied no reasons for why it would have departed from the quasi-Griffith test. As in Fetterly, 
the absence of reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho 
retroactivity test. 
Card was a unified direct and initial post-conviction appeal case. Here, as with Fetterly, 
the State claims that the Court "implicitly rejected" the Linlcletter test. And, again as with 
Fetterly, it reaches its conclusion by equating the majority's silence regarding the Linklettev test 
with its rejecting that test. As the State notes, Justice Bistline advocated, in his dissent, for the 
application of the Linkletter test while the majority applied the new rule "without any reference 
to the three-prong Linkletter test." Respondent's Brief at 17. In fact, the majority applied the 
quasi-Grfjth rule without any reference to any retroactivity test or any discussion of the 
retroactive application of the new rule. Thus, just as in Fetterly, the majority opinion ignores 
Justice Bistline's argument. This lack of discussion does not mean that the Court was rejecting 
Justice Bistline's argument. The majority might have been in agreement with Justice Bistlille 
that the Linkletter test he employed to determine the retroactive applicability of the new rule; if it 
did so, it may simply have reached different conclusions regarding the weight of each of the three 
factors and, therefore, the outcome of the test's application. Indeed, Justice Bistline 
acknowledged this by noting only that "the majority seems to assume that Payne applies here, 
such is not necessarily the case." Card at 461, 11 17 (italics added). In any event, the absence of 
reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho retroactivity test. 
Finally, the State argues that by not adopting the position of the dissent on retroactivity, 
the majority rejected it in State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991). For the same 
reason that this argument fails wit11 regard to the holdings in Fetterly and Caud, it fails here. 
And, again, the Court's providing no reasons for departing from the quasi-Grfjth test strongly 
suggests that the majority did not intend to alter the Idaho retroactivity test. 
See supra at 5-7. Butler, a non-capital case, applies the quasi-Grffith test without providing 
reasons for the departure from the Linlclettev test. "The Fettevly Court held that while this Court 
applied Charboneau to cases that were still open for sentenciilg on the date Charboneau was 
released, the defendant's case in Fettevly was finally decided. . . .The remittitur in Butler's direct 
appeal was issued on November 12, 1992. . . . On December 28, 1993, this court decided 
Townsend. . . . Townsend does not apply to Butler's case." Butlev, 129 Idaho at 901-02,935 P.2d 
at 164-5. As in Fettevly, the absence of reasons strongly suggests that the majority did not intend 
to alter the Idaho retroactivity test. Similar language may also be found in a 1993 case from this 
Court, State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790,795,852 P.2d 1387, 1392 (1993) ("We hold that the 
Guzman decision will be applied retroactively to all cases that had not become final when 
Guzman was issued, including those that were in progress in the trial courts. See Grfjth v. 
Keiztucly, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987); Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 
(1991)."). C j  State v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 531, 861 P.2d 95, 101 (Ct.App. 1993) 
(recognizing that in Josephson, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Guzman's "rejection of the 
'good faith' exception is retroactively applicable to all cases that had not become final when 
Guzman was issued, including those that were in progress in the trial courts.") (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
While Linkletter was applied in none of the State's five cases, the Court engaged in no 
retroactivity ai~alysis hedding light on its apparent departure. Importantly, these cases provide 
only an incomplete picture of the Court's retroactivity rulings from the 1990s. In 1993, the same 
year that it decided Josephson, the Court decided the retroactive effect of a new decision without 
referring, expressly or otherwise, to the quasi-Gviffith bright line of finality rule. State v. Dopp, 
124 Idaho 481,861 P.2d 51 (1993). At issue was what showing a defendant must make to be 
entitled to withdraw a guilty plea. The Dopp court overruled its earlier holding in State v. 
Jackron, 96 Idaho 584, 532 P.2d 926 (1975), finding that "withdrawal [of an Alford plea] is not 
an automatic right and more substantial reasons than just asserting legal innocence must be 
given." Id. at 486, 56. The Court then limited its new mle to all guilty pleas entered afier tile 
Dopp decision date. Id. This iinmitatioll plainly excludes from the retroactive application of Dopp 
some of those whose convictions were not final at the time of that decision, specifically anyone 
who entered a guilty plea before the Dopp decision date but whose case remained in trial court 
(e.g., because a sentence had not yet been imposed). It is plain from the reasoning in Dopp as 
well that the Court did not ernploy the bright line of finality test. 
Fetterly, Stuart, Butler, and .Josephsorz are examples of this Court's temporary 
determination that the distinction of import ibr questions of retroactivity is between those cases 
in which direct appeal was complete, and those in which it was not, at the time the new case was 
decided. The Court draws this same distinction in another direct appeal case cited by the State, 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991), as support for the proposition that Justice 
Bistline's criticism there of the majority's failure to address the Linkletter test and the cases he 
cites somehow demonstrates that "[ilt is clear that Griffith changed Idaho's retroactive test in 
criminal cases and LC. g19-2719 changed the mle in capital cases." Respondent's Brief at 18. 
This Court has never held, stated in dicta, or merely alluded to a distinction between initial 
petition and successive petition post-conviction cases for retroactivity analysis purposes. The 
distinction the State draws between initial and successive post-conviction petitions is a 
distinction without a difference for Idaho retroactivity analysis purposes. 
Further, the Court had been relying on the Linkletter test since 1974. Thompson v 
Hagan. And it employed that test in all manner of cases (civil and criminal, direct appeal and 
post-conviction) throughout the 1970s, the 1980s, and into the 1990s. See, e.g., .Jones v. Watson, 
98 Idaho 606, 608, 570 P.2d 284, 286 (1977) (creditor lawsuit); State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 
587 P.2d 305 (1978) (first degree burglary convictions);State v. Machevi, 100 Idaho 167, 595 
P.2d 316 (1979) (escape conviction); Gay v. County Commissioners of Bo~tneville County, 103 
Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (Ct.App.1982) (zoning case); State v. Tisdale, 103 Idaho 836,654 P.2d 
1389 (Ct.App. 1982) (citing to Gay as authority for three-factor Linkletter test); Robertson v 
Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 793 P.2d 21 1 (1990) (tort action); Baizer 
v. Shavers, III.c., 117 Idaho 696,791 P.2d 1275 (1990); Potlatch Corp. v. Idaho State Tux Coin'iz, 
120 Idaho 1, 813 P.2d 340 (1991) (tax case); and V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petvoleurn clean Water 
Trust Fund, 128 Idaho 890, 894-95,920 P.2d 909,913-14 (1996) (transfer reeltax case) 
Recently, in describing Idaho's current retroactivity law, the Court reached back to three 
of its seminal retroactivity decisions from the 1970s, Thompson, Tipton, and Watson, as support 
for its holding: 
The usual rule is that decisions of this Court apply retroactively to all past and 
pending cases. State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670,587 P.2d 305 (1978). For policy 
reasons, however, this Court has discretion to limit the retroactive application of a 
particular decision. . . .When deciding whether to limit the retroactive application 
of a decision we weigh three factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; (2) the 
reliance upon the prior law; and (3) the effect upon the administration ofjustice if 
the decision is applied retroactively. Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 
1365 (1974). We balance the first factor against the other two to determine 
whether to limit the retroactive application of the decision. Jones v. Watson., 98 
Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977). 
BHA Investnzents, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 173, 108 P.3d 315, 320 (2004). The 
Court has very recently cited in a cril~lillal case to Tipton as support for the proposition that a 
judicial rule may be given only prospective effect if it overrules precedent on which the parties 
inay have justifiably relied. State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 181 P.3d 440 (2008).6 Plainly, if the 
quasi-Grfjtlz rule was ever live Idaho doctrine, it is no longer. 
Even if it would make sense (which it would not) to read the proposition for which Tipton 
is cited as invoking the Fetterly bright line of finality test, citing to Tzpton rather than Fetterly or 
one of the other cases from the 1990s employing the Fetterly test is inconsistent with such a 
reading. While standing alone, then, Adair may not be a clear invocation or application of the 
Linkletter test, it and the Fetterly bright line of finality test clearly are mutually exclusive. When 
read in the context of BHA Investments, Inc., Adair reflects the Court's adoption of the Lznkletter 
test for determining the retroactive effect of a new decision which breaks wit11 precedent. 
Thus, whatever the Court's intent in the 1990s, Linkletter plainly remains Idaho's 
retroactivity test. 
B. Under Linkletter, Ring Should Be Applied To Idaho Cases 
On Collateral Review. 
On the State's view, even under Linkletter, Ring is not retroactively applicable on 
collateral review. Respondent's Brief at 28-31. This is because, the State continues, the United 
States Supreme Court has already decided that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is not 
retroactively applicable. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 
'While the State asserts that Adair is irrelevant to Linkletter's applicability, Respondent's 
Brief at 17 n.7, Adair's consideration of a criminal case in terms of Linkletter's retroactivity 
analytical organization is clearly significant. 
391 U.S. 145 (1968). The State contends that "[tlhere is simply no basis for distinguishing . . . 
DeStefano[.]" Respondent's Brief at 3 1. In fact, there are three deep, obvious, and relevant 
divides between DeStefano and the instant case 
First, the question in DeStefano was whether tlie Sixth Amendme~it right to jury guilt 
phase trial was retroactively applicable, whereas the question before this Court is much more 
limited. Here, llowever, the question not only concerns just the sentencing phase but, 111ore 
narrowly still, tlie initial question in that proceeding: whether a capital defendant is eligible for 
the death penalty.7 The practical difference between the questions posed by Danfovth and this 
case is seen in how the third of tlie three factors is framed. The DeStefano court found that 
the effect of a holding of general retroactivity on law enforce~iient and the 
administration of justice would be significant, because the denial ofjury trial has 
occurred in a very great number of cases in those States not until now according 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee. For exa~nple, in Louisiana all those co~ivicted of 
noncapital serious crimes could make a Sixth Amendment argument. And, 
depending on tlie Court's decisions about unanimous and 12-man juries, all 
convictions for serious crimes in certain other States would be in jeopardy. 
Id. at 634. The case at bar, by contrast, implicates an extremely limited number of cases. Only 
capital cases would be affected by a finding that the right to a jury determination of death penalty 
eligibility is retroactive. Of the capital cases in Idaho, eleven or, at most, twelve cases would be 
affected. Opening Brief at 21 n.6. While this is a co~npelling difference, there is another, 
perhaps more compelling, one. The DeStefano court was partly driven by a perceived twin risk 
of gargantuan proportion to the adini~iistration of justice: not merely the prospect "in Louisiana 
7The Court has vely recentIy noted that the holding in Ring is limited to this question. 
State v. Payne, slip op. at *27,2008 WL 5205959 (Idaho 12115108) ("Although unnecessary 
under Ring v. Arizona, it is very plain the Idaho Legislature meant that in all capital cases after 
the enactme~it of the 2003 arnendme~its juries were to conduct the analysis the judge had 
previously conducted under the old LC. § 19-2515."). 
[ofl all those convicted of noncapital serious crimes. . .making a Sixth Amendment argument 
[and, therefore, at risk of being released, but also by the prospect ofl all col~victions for serious 
crimes in certain other States. . .be[ing] in jeopardy." Id. at 634. There is no risk of release in 
the instant or any case which could be governed by the Court's holding that Ring retroactively 
applies on collateral review. The very worst case scenario from the State's perspective is that of 
a resentencing proceeding resulting in a life without parole sentence. Thus, the retroactivity 
question presented by the instant case differs dramatically from that decided in DeStefano in 
ways which should result, correlatively, in dramatically less weight being accorded the 
administrative ofjustice part of the Linkletter test. 
Second, the DeStefano court's Sixth Amendment jury trial right analysis was exclusively 
in terms of individual defendants' right to trial by jury. Nowhere in the dccisioll is there mention 
or consideration of the prospective jurors' stake in that right. Thus, the Court's collclusion that 
"[tlhe value implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring 
retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial" is in no way an assessment of whether the value to the community 
would be served by requiring retrial of persons convicted of the gravest offense and sentenced to 
the harshest penalty. Id. at 634. See infra at 15; Opening Brief at 14-17. 
Third, contrary to the State's argument, the value judgments made by courts of co- 
ordinate jurisdiction, in this instance the United States Supreme Court, neither prevent nor 
absolve this Court from making its own deliberate assessments of each of the tlwee factors. This 
is not only because, as outlined in the last two paragraphs, the question at issue in this case is 
different from that presented in DeStefano, but also because it is the essence of the holding in 
Danforth. See, e.g., id. at 1041 (the Teague test "was tailored to the unique context of federal 
habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own 
postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion"). It is also because the facts which 
inform the assessment may differ between jurisdictions.' Historically, different states have made 
different assessments in applying those factors to determine the retroactive effect of a new mle. 
In fact, other courts of coordinate jurisdiction have employed the Linlcletter test to reach 
conflicting conclusions on whether Ring may be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review. Cornpave, ee.g., Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400,412 (Fla. 2005) (applying three factor 
test, concludes Ring is not retroactive on collateral review) and State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 
253 (Mo. 2003) (applying three factor test, concludes Ring is retroactive 011 collateral review). 
There is no reason to assume that this Court will or should make the same assessments and reach 
the same conclusioi~s as the United States Supreme Court or any other court of coordinate 
jurisdiction. Cf: State v. Newrnaiz, 108 Idaho 5, 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 862 n.6 (1985) ("Long gone 
are the days when state courts will blindly apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and 
methodology when in the process of interpreting their own constitutions."). 
DeStefano does not control. Independent application of the Linkletter test demonstrates 
that Ring should be applied to collateral review cases. 
The dual purposes of the fundamental right to jury trial guaranteed state defendants by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is to protect individual defendants and to ensure community 
participation in serious trials, thereby ensuring that cominunity values are reflected in the 
'Of course, the relevant facts may change over time within a single jurisdiction. Thus, 
with regard to some new rules, it may be that a change in relevant facts would lead a court to 
change its assessment. 
sentence imposed. Applying Ring to collateral review cases would further these purposes, 
whereas failure to do so would thwart them. Failure to apply Ring retroactively in collateral 
review cases would thwart its dual purposes. Having been denied his fundamental right to a juiy 
detennination of eligibility for a death sentence, Mr. Fields would be executed pursuant to a 
sentence which cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. At the same time, the coinmunity 
would be denied participation in a critical part of the most serious kind of criminal trial, the 
sentencing proceeding of a capital trial. 
As for the reliance on the prior state of the law, the State has no interest in executing 
uizconstitutionally imposed sentences. The State does not dispute that the federal constitutional 
issue ofjury participation in capital sentencing proceedings was hotly disputed, at least until the 
United States Supreme Court temporarily and mistakenly "settled" the question in Waltoiz v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). While Fields was sentenced post-Walton, the State's reliance on 
an erroneous Supreme Court decision should carry relatively little weight given the few cases 
affected and the fundamental right that was violated. 
Additionally, because applying Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review would 
affect only a small number of cases, the weight accorded the reliance factor should be small. 
Gaf-fod v. State, 127 Idaho 472,475,903 P.2d 61,64, reh 'g denied (1995) (on case before 
Court, retroactive effect to cases already final found to be "of limited applicability and will affect 
only those criminal defendants currently [committed] in Idaho under the prior statutory scheme"). 
Finally, applying Ring retroactively to cases on collateral review will have a substantial 
positive but minimal, if any, negative impact on the administration ofjustice. The number of 
cases which could be affected is known: ten, or depending on the outcome of the federal district 
court's order granting sentencing relief in one case, possibly eleven. See Opening Brief at 21 n.6. 
This Court has previously allowed retroactive application where it would add a relatively small 
number of cases to the district courts' dockets. See, e.g., Bergman v. Ifenvy, 115 Idaho 259, 263, 
766 P.2d 729,733 (1988) (retroactively applying a new rule finding that cause of actioil lies 
against a licensed vendor of intoxicating beverages for the wrongful death of and personal 
injuries to third parties caused by the continued serving of alcohol to the patron of the bar). 
Based on the small number of cases at stake here, the administration ofjustice factor weighs 
strongly in favor of retroactively applyingRing. Finally, administration of justice must also be 
measured by the degree to which the public's respect for judicial decisions through justice and 
equitable outcomes will likely continue. The jury injects a democratic element into the law. 
This element is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not only in safeguarding 
the rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular acceptance of the law and the necessaly 
general acquiescence in their application. Green v. US.,  356 U.S. 165, 215-16 (1958) (Black, J., 
dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.) (citations, internal quotation marks, and 
footnotes omitted). Far from maintaining the public's continuing respect for the judiciary, 
treating similarly situated individuals dissiinilarly based on fortuity creates a lack of trust -which 
is, of course, precisely the reason why the Constitution and Bill of Rights guarantee jury trials. 
Retroactively applying Ring will further its purpose, whereas not retroactively apply it 
would thwart its purpose. There was no legitimate reliance in pre-Wnlton cases on the refusal to 
involve juries in sentencing proceedings. Applying Ring retroactively will have a net substantial 
positive effect on the administration ofjustice. Under Linlclettev, Ring must be retroactively 
applied to cases on collateral review. 
The Court also has the authority to prevent the need for resentencing proceedings in those 
few cases by reducing the sentence at issue to the maximum legal term. State v. Lindquist, 99 
Idaho 766,589 P.2d 101 (1979) (when defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, he was 
necessarily found guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder; accordingly, 
despite the fact that defendant could not be sentenced under the' uilconstitutional death penalty 
statute then in effect or under the unconstitutional pre-amendment version, it was appropriate to 
remand the cause to district court for resentenciilg to any punishment permitted for conviction of 
the lesser included offense of second-degree murder); State v; Creech, 99 Idaho 779, 589 P.2d 
114 (Idaho1979) (remanded for resentencing consistent with State v. Lindquist); see also, State v. 
Mouuis, 131 Idaho 263, 267, 954 P.2d 681, 685 (1998) (district court's Rule 35 motion denial 
reversed, and appellant's sentence modified to bring it within legal limits) 
11. THE TEAGUE RETROACTIVITY TEST, TAILORED TO THE FEDERAL 
COURTS' OBLIGATION TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE NATION'S 
FEDERALIST SYSTEM, SHOULD NOT BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE LONG 
ESTABLISHED IDAHO TEST FOR DETERMINING THE RETROACTIVE 
EFFECT OF NEW DECISIONAL LAW. 
Teague was fashioned to reflect and promote our Nation's federalist system, specifically 
the role federal courts play in relation to state courts. As the United States Supreme Court has 
recently noted, Teague speaks to the need for comity and respect for finality of state court 
convictions in o w  federalist system. "If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of 
allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a bvoader class of individuals than is required by 
Teague. And while finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as federal 
habeas, finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States 
are Bee to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are 
seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts." Danforth, 128 S.Ct. at 
1041 (emphasis added). 
The State contends that if theCou~t rejects its argument that Idaho Code Section 19- 
2719(5) prohibits the courts from entertaining any successive capital post-conviction claim based 
on the retroactive application of new law, then it should adopt the Teague standard for 
determining a new decision's retroactive effect. Respondent's Brief at 24-27. For the reasons set 
forth here and in the Opening Brief, the Court should decline the State's invitation and adhere to 
the Linkletter test. 
Tile arguments in favor of adopting the Teague test, the State claims, are that it will (1) 
"provide unifomity in Idaho's application of new rules of criminal law[,]" (2) "eliminate a 
confusing and unbridled standard that was abandoned years ago by the [United States] Supreme 
Court and a majority of states[,]" and (3) preserve finality ofjudgments, without which "'the 
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect."' Id. at 27 (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 
A.2d 736, 749 (Del. 1990)). The State also notes that the United States Supreme Court has 
criticized the Linkletter standard as "'unprincipled and inequitable."' Respondent's Brief at 24 
(quoting Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S.Ct. at 1037). The State notes, as well, that the Supreme 
Court criticized the Linlcletter standard as leading "'to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of 
siinilarly situated defendants on collateral review"' due to its '"failure to treat retfoactivity as a 
threshold question and [its] inability to account for the nature and function of collateral review."' 
Respondent's Brief at 25. These three argumeilts are addressed below in serial order. 
A. Far From Creating Uniformity In Idaho's Application Of New Rules Of 
Crimi~lal Law, The Tcague Standard Has Created Illegitimate And Massive 
Disparities In The Application Of Those New Rules. 
As noted just above, the State recites the United States Supreme Court's criticislns of the 
Linkletter test. Those criticisms were lodged by the Teague court. It should come as no surprise, 
then, that the criticisins assume a pre-ordained divide between cases on direct review and those 
on collateral review. One of the criticisins was that the Linlcletter test led to indefensible 
disparities in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review. Whatever one 
thinks of the direct/collateral review distinction in theory, it is indisputable that in practice 
whether a particular case remains in direct appeal proceedings or moves into collateral 
proceedings is a matter of how quiclcly (or not) a case is processed by the judicial system. For 
this reason, the Teague standard creates unprincipled and inequitable disparities in the treatment 
of defendants are identically situated but for fortuitous timing differences. 
For these same reasons, Respondent's argument that fundamental fairness is not violated 
by a failure to apply Ring retroactively is mis-guided. Lilce the arbitrary application of the death 
penalty found uncoiistitutio~~al in Furrnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (criticizing 
"capricously selected random handful" of death sentences as "cruel and unusual in the sanle way 
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual")(Stewart, J., concurring), the random, 
fortuitous grant of a jury trial right to some, but not all capitally sentenced inmates in Idaho is 
unprincipled and inequitable. 
The instant case illustrates exactly how fortuitous differences can lead to the enforcement 
of a fundainental constitutional right in one person's case and the intentional lack of enforcement 
of that same fundamental constitulional right in another person's, with the lives of both 
individuals hanging in the balance. As noted in the Opening Brief, Mr. Fetterly was charged with 
first degree murder in 1983 while Mr. Fields was charged in 1989. After Mr. Fetterly's initial 
death sentence was overtunled by the federal courts, he was resentenced to death. His direct 
appeal fkom that resentencing was ongoing when Ring was decided. Consequently, in 2002, this 
Court ordered that Mr. Fetterly's case be remanded for resentencing proceedings. By contrast, 
Mr. Fields, convicted approximately six years after Mr. Fetterly, has been in collateral 
proceedings since the early 1990s. He has been denied Ring relief under Teague. Mr. Fetterly 
received Ring relief based on the chance event that the federal courts ordered sentencing relief, 
not based on anything he did, 
B. Finality's Purpose Of Administrative Efficiency Must Not Trump 
Fundamentai Constitutional Rights. 
The argument that finality is necessary to prevent the release of large numbers of 
convicted criminals or the expenditure of large sums of money necessary for further court 
proceedings to avoid their release implies that finality is of no concenl in the Linlcletter test. But 
the implication is plainly false. The third factor in the Linklettev test talces finality into account in 
considering the administrative burden which would be caused by the retroactive application of 
the new rule. Instead, the State's argument seems to be that finality should trump other 
legitimate considerations, e.g.- that the violated right is a fundamental constitutional right. 
C. Finality No More Favors Teague Than Linkletter. 
The State cites finality as a value which supports the adoptio~l of the Teague test. 
Respondent's Brief at 26 (providing as an example of why some other states have adopted 
Teague that Illinois did so "focusing up011 the interests of finality"). This wrongly suggests that 
the LinWetter test either undervalues or altogether fails to talce finality into account. The weight 
a court gives the second and third Linlcletter factors-prior reliar~ce and effect on the 
administration ofjustice-is partly a function of the value placed on finality. With Teague, on the 
other hand, finality is the only value generally worthy of consideration. Its two exceptions are 
just that, exceptions. And the United States Supreme Court has made the extraordinarily limited 
scope of the second exception very plain: "This class of rules is extremely narrow, and 'it is 
unlikely that any. . . has yet to emerge."'Schviro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) 
(quoting Tyler v. Caiiz, 533 U.S. 656,667 n. 7 (2001) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 
243 (1990)) (internal quotation marlcs omitted). If this Court were to replace Linlcletter with 
Teague, it would be replacing discretion with rigidity. 
Finality was introduced into retroactivity jurisprudence when, in the 1960s, the United 
States Supreme Court decided several cases introducing into legal practice a variety 
constitutionally guaranteed rules of criminal procedure. At issue in Linkletter, for example, "was 
whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which made the exclusionary rule applicable to the 
States, should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review." Teague, 489 U.S. at 302. 
The test developed in Linklettev and, more specifically, its application in that and similar cases in 
the 1960s responded to the fear that Mapp and the related decisions would cause the release of a 
large percentage of defendants convicted of serious crimes. But Lznkletter allows for sensible 
judgments in different factual contexts. Where the threat of emptying prisolls is not so great or 
where, as in the instant case, it is non-existent, courts need not accord as much weight to the 
administration ofjustice factor. Teague allows no such flexibility. 
Obviously, Teague represents the court's nonnative judgment that finality should trump 
most other values. The second exception to the non-retroactivity presumptioil for some 
constitutionally mandated rules of criminal procedure incorporates the normative judgment that 
when the likelihood of an accurate convictioll is seriously diminished without the new procedural 
rule under consideration, finality should be trumped. But Teague nowhere suggests any 
appreciation for according some similarly heightened value to those constitutionally mandated 
~ules  of criminal procedure aimed at not only protecting individual defendants but, by reinforcing 
the particular constitutional structure of our government, the citizenry generally. See, e .g ,  
Dickerson v. US. ,  530 U.S. 428 (2000) (though the Mirando rule is a prophylactic, it "safeguards 
a 'fundamental trial right"') (quoting Wilhrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,691 (1993)). The Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial is a right with just such a dual purpose. See supva at 13-16; 
Opening Brief at 14-17. Teague fails to allow courts to account for this duality by failing to 
allow them, when detennining whether the right to jury trial applies retroactively to cases on 
collateral review, to consider the Idaho citizens' stalce in preserving the structure of their 
govemnent-specifically, preserving undiminished the federal right to trial by jury as a check 
against potential government abuse. Even if the presumptive non-retroactivity of Teague were 
attractive, its exceptions are too narrow. Courts inust not relinquish authority to retroactively 
apply newly acknowledged rules of criminal procedure mandated by fundamental constitutional 
rights, especially those which serve not merely to protect individual defendants but the 
governmental structure of our Nation as well. In addition to the policy reasons for why courts 
sliould not do this, the constitutioi~al separation of powers mandate prohibits their doing it. For 
pronouncing that a constitutionally mandated, judicially acknowledged but not legislatively 
codified rule is retroactively applicable is an essential function of the courts. Relinquishing it is 
to legislate a fundamental change of Idaho's government structure, and doing so would thus 
infringe on the legislative ftmction in violation of the constitutionally mandated separation of 
powers 
Even if the Court were to relinquish that authority generally, there is at least one 
constitutional constraint prohibiting total relinquishment. Deploying, especially where nothing 
compels it and where the defendant has done nothing to deserve it, a judicially created doctrine to 
preclude reaching the merits of a claimed violation of a federal constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental right violates federal co~lstitutionally guaranteed due process. 
D. There Is No Evidence That The Finality Of Judgments Has A Deterrent 
Effect. 
The State repeats the fi-equently made assertion that finality has a detenent effect. 
However, it does not burden its assertion with factual support. It is, at best, a highly suspect 
proposition that most individuals who murder would not -if only they ltnew that constitutional 
rights acknowledged after their conviction and sentence were final would not apply to them. 
E. While The Majority Of States Have Adopted Teague, It Is Unclear How 
Many Understood That The Federal Constitution Empowered Them To Do 
Otherwise. 
The State asserts that the majority of states have adopted Teague. While that may be so, 
it is also true that, before Danforth, a variety of state high courts mistaltenly believed that they 
had no choice, at least with respect to federal constitutional rights. Further, judicial decision- 
making is not a popularity contest. The question should not be whether the majority of courts 
rule one way or another, hut whether there is thoughtful dispute between those states which have 
adopted different approaches. The fact that there is a sig~lificant split suggests that there is 
thoughtful dispute. The decisioils reflect this as well. Finally, at least thirteen state high courts 
have adopted non-Teague tests for determining the retroactive application of new stale law n~les.  
See, e.g., Smart v. State, 146 P.3d 15, 28 (Alas. App. 2006) (Alaska's retroactivity test is 
Linkletter); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386,393,64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (applying a hybrid 
Teague-Linkletter test for determining whether a ~ u l e  is retroactive); People v. Carrera, 49 
Cal.3d 291, 3 12-13, 777 P.2d 121, 142-43 (1989) (declining to adopt Teague for state law 
retroactivity issues); Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 400,409 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting Teague and 
applying its own retroactivity test); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'i 360, 378, 878 P.2d 699, 717 
(1994) (reaffining that Linlcletter is retroactivity test. for new state law); Pohutski v. City of 
Allen Purl,  465 Mich. 675,641 N.W.2d 219 (2002) (court applies Linkletter, explaining that 
Teague doesn't apply to new slate law); State v. Whi$eld, 107 S.W.3d 253,267 (Mo. 2003) 
(adopting Liizklettev); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 518 (S.D. 1990) (rejecting Teague); 
People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645,647-48,717 N.E.2d 684, 686-87 (1999) (applies Linlcletter 
for state law retroactivity issues); Page v. Palmateev, 336 Or.379, 382-84, 84 P.3d 133, 136-38 
(2004) (not bound by federal retroactivity doctrine when determining retroactive application of 
new state law); Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748,755 (Tenn. 1993) (declining to adopt Teague 
for state co~~stitutional l ws); Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 912 n.9 (Utah 
1993) (noting that Court adopted Linkletter in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983)); 
Farbotnilc v. State, 850 P.2d 594, 601-02 (Wyo. 1993) (reaffirming that Linklettev test still used 
post-Teague because allows the court "to weigh the interest of justice"). 
111. IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-271 9 ALLOWS SUCCESSIVE 
POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS BASED ON THE RETROACTIVE 
APPLICATION OF NEW DECISIONAL RULES OF LAW. 
The State argues that Idaho's legislature has removed from her courts jurisdiction to 
consider successive capital post-conviction claims based on the retroactive applicatioli o f  new 
rules o f  law. Respondent's Brief at 7-23. Even though Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) 
explicitly prohibits such claims, the Stale expressly eschews that subsection as the basis o f  its 
argument. hstead, the State opts to base its argument on Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5), which 
was enacted before Section 19-2719(5)(c) and which contains no language regarding 
retroactivity. Subsection A addresses the State's jurisdictio~~al argument. 
In the course o f  making its jurisdictional argument, the State disputes some but not all o f  
the arguments Mr. Fields makes in his Opening Brief attacking Section 19-2719(5) and Section 
19-2719(5)(c) on state and federal constitutional grounds. 111 particular, the State argues that 
Section 19-2719(5) does not violate either the Idaho Constitution's separation o f  powers mandate 
or Mr. Fields' state and federal rights to due process aid equal protection. Along the way, the 
State argues that the legislature's expression at the tiine o f  enacting Section 19-2719(5) that it be 
applied retroactively ineans that successive post-conviction claims in capital cases based on the 
retroactive application of  new mles o f  law are prohibited. These arguments are addressed in 
serial order below. 
A. Applying Established Rules Of Statutory Analysis Demonstrates That The 
Legislature Intended Idaho Code $19-2719(5) To Allow Successive Post- 
Conviction Claims Based On The Retroactive Application Of New Rules Of 
Law. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) sets out the general rule that capital defendants are 
limited to a single post-conviction petition: 
Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgiiient imposing the punish~nent 
of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the defendant must file any legal or 
factual challenge to the sentence or convictio~i that is known or reasonably should 
be known. 
I.C. 519-2719(3). The State notes that the only exception to this rule is provided for by Section 
19-2719(5), and that the Court has suinrnarized the exception to this rule as allowiiig "those 
unusual cases where it can be de~nonstrated that the issues raised were not ltnown and reasonably 
could not have been known within the tinie frame allowed by the statute." State v. Rhoatles, 120 
Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665,677 (1991); Respondent's Brief at 9. Section 19-2719(5) also 
provides, the State iiotes, that "[ijf a capital defendant fails to co~nply with the specific 
requirements of I.C. 519-2719, including the specified time limits, the issues are 'deemed to have 
[been] waived' and '[tlhe courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for 
relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.' LC. $19-2719(5); McKinney [v. State], 
133 Idaho [695,] 700[, 992 P.2d 144,1149 [(1999)]." Respondent's Brief at 9. The State claims 
that the Idaho Code Sectioii 19-2719(5) exception to the general rule restricting capital 
defendants to a single post-conviction petition does not allow claims based on the retroactive 
application of new rules of law. 
The State argues that because Mr. Fields failed to raise his jury participation in sentencing 
proceedings claiin in his initial consolidated appeal," hut that the claim was ltnown at that time, 
and therefore, that section 19-2719 precludes its being raised in a successive petition. 
Acknowledging that in Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), the Court has allowed a 
successive petition on a claim raised in earlier proceedings, the State contends that the new 
information there was new evidence whereas here it is merely a new constitutional right 
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court. While in Sivak, the Court was concerned 
that failure to allow the successive claim would block the consideration of aprirna facie actual 
innocence claim, the State suggests that no siinilarly compelling concern is at issue here. Instead, 
according to the State, all that is at issue is "a new technicality which the original courts never 
envisioned[.]" Respondent's Brief at 14. 
1. Applied to Section 19-2719(5), long established rules of statutory 
analysis demonstrate that the legislature intended $19-2719(5) to 
allow successive capital claims based on retroactive application of new 
decisional rules of law. 
The meaning of Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) is plain on its face, and it has nothing 
whatsoever to say about retroactivity. 
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the 
time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as 
were known, or reasonably should have been ltnown. The courts of Idaho shall 
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or 
grant any such relief. 
'But see Opening Brief at 1-2 (citing this court's prior determination, in response to 
argument raised in Fields' brief, rejecting Fields' argument that his sentencing proceeding was 
coilstitutionally infirm for lack ofjury determination in the finding of an aggravating 
circumstance). 
LC. $19-2719(5). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. Slate v. McCoy, 
128 Idaho 362, 365,913 P.2d 578,581 (1996). Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court 
assumes that the legislature meai~t what is clearly stated in the statute." State v. Rhode, 133 
Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). For these reasons, the State's project to read 
retroactivity into Section 19-2719(5) trips at the starting gate. 
Even if ambiguity is read into Section 19-2719(5), the State's argument utterly fails to 
apply long established rules of statutory analysis. Applying these principles reveals that the 
legislature intended Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) to allow successive post-conviction claims 
resting on the retroactive application of new rules of law. First, the State never addresses how 
Section 19-2719 (5) can possibly be squared with the legislature's later amendii-ig subsection 
(5)(c) into the statute, expressly prohibiting as facially illsufficient any "successive post- 
conviction pleading. . .to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." I.C. 
$19-2719(5)(~) (1995). 
This Court has long held that it will not presume that the legislature intends to enact 
duplicative statutory provisions and, conelatively, that the particular statutory words being 
inspected must be construed in light of the remaining statutory language. For example, the Court 
has repeatedly relied on the no duplicative language statutory provisions language in discerning 
the meaning of the "utter disregard" aggravating factor in Idaho's capital sentencing scheme. 111 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,436, 825 P.2d 1081, 1092 (1991), the Court traced that history, 
noting that it was first called upon to determine the meaning of the "utter disregard" aggravating 
factor in State v. Osbovn, 102 Idaho 405,418-19,631 P.2d 187,200-01 (1981). There, to apply 
the no duplicative provision presumption, the Court held that it had to compare the "utter 
disregard" factor to the other factors to ensure that whatever meaning ascribed to "utter 
disregard" was not part of one of the remaining aggravating factors, rendering the factor under 
consideration Inere surplusage. 
To properly define this circumsta~~ce, it is important to note the other aggravating 
circuinstances with which this provision overlaps. The second aggravating 
circumstance, I.C. 519-25 15(f)(2), that the defendant committed another murder at 
the time this murder was committed, obviously could show ail utter disregard for 
huinan life, as could the third aggravating circumstance, LC. 519-25 15(f)(3), that 
the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. The same 
can be said for the fourth aggravating circumstance, I.C. $19-2515($)(4), that the 
murder was committed for remuneration. Since we will not presume that the 
legislative intent was to duplicate any already enumerated circumstance, thus 
making I.C. ij 19-2515(f)(6) mere surplusage (See, e. g., Norton v. Dept. of 
Employment, 94 Idaho 924,500 P.2d 825 (1972)), we hold that the phrase 
"utter disregard" must be viewed in reference to acts other than those set 
forth in I.C. $5 19-2515(f)(2), (3), and (4). We coilclude instead that the phrase 
is meant to be reflective of acts or circu~nstances urrounding the crime which 
exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the 
cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. 
State v. Carcl, 121 Idaho 425,436, 825 P.2d 1081, 1092 (1991) (quoting State v. Osborn, 102 
Idaho 405,418-19,631 P.2d 187,200-01 (1981) (emphasis added and quotation marks omitted)). 
The Card Court relied on the no duplicative provision presunlption in State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 
82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989), to distinguish t l ~ e  utter disregard aggravator from the "heinous, 
atrocious or cruel" aggravator 
[Tlhe "utter disregard" factor refers not lo the outrageousness of the acts 
constitutinn the murder, but to the defendant's lack of conscientious scruoles - 
against killing another hurnan being. 
.... 
The particularly cold-blooded ltiller need not act sadistically or in a particularly 
outrageous fashion in order to commit a killing with utter disregard for human 
life. One who commits a crime in an especially heinous way is punished for the 
heinousness of his crime, not because he acted with utter disregard for human life, 
although it may be expected that most especially heinous, atrocious or cruel 
murders will have been committed with utter disregard for human life. 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho at 436, 825 P.2d at 1092 (quoting State v. Fain, 116 Idaho at 99, 774 
P.2d at 269).1° 
The State's contention that the pre-subsection (c) version of Section 19-2719 does not 
allow post-conviction petition claims which rely on tlle retroactive application of a new n ~ l e  of 
law runs afoul of the no duplicative statutory language principle. The State careftllly notes that it 
"is not relying upon I.C. $19-2719(5)(c), but upon LC. $19-2719(5), which does not provide an 
exception for the retroactive applicatioii of new rules of law, as established by this Court in 
Fetterly." The problem with the State's gloss on Section 19-2719(5) is that it renders into mere 
surplusage the legislature's subsequent enactment of Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s prohibition of any 
successive post-conviction petition that seeks retroactive application of new rules of law. The 
legislature would have had no need to enact Section 19-2719(5)(c) unless Section 19-2719(5) 
allowed retroactive application of new rules of law. 
''See Stueve v. Northern Lights, Inc., 118 Idaho 422,425,797 P.2d 130, 133 (1990) ("We 
do not make mere 'surplusage' of the provisions of the statutes, and that we construe them, 
insofal- as possible, to give ~neaning to all of their parts in light of the legislative intent expressed 
therein."); Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401,403,757 P.2d 664,666 (1988) ("[Olur prior 
cases have held that 8tatutoly or constitutional provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be 
interpreted in the context of the entire document. Wright v. Willer, 11 1 Idaho 474,476, 725 P.2d 
179, 181 (1986) ( 'Statutes must be read to give effect to evely word, clause and sentence.'); 
Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688,690,692 P.2d 332, 334, reh'g denied (1984) ('We will 
not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of the provisions included 
therein.'); Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 310-1 1, 658 P.2d 978, 981-82,petition 
for review denied (Ct. App. 1983) ("The particular words of a statute should be read in context; 
and the statute as a whole should be construed, if possible, to give meaning to all its parts in light 
of the legislative intent."). 
Second, "[ilt is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has full 
knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state. C. Forsnzan Real Estate 
Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 5 11,547 P.2d 11 16 (1976); Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass 'n v. Robison, 65 
Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944); Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 48 Cal.3d 602, 257 Ca1.Rptr. 
320,770 P.2d 732 (1989); Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 678 P.2d 934 (1984)." George W 
Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540,797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990). Further, "[tlhe 
legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an 
intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of 110 
other reasonable construction." Id. 
The Ida110 Code provides that 
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, 
the constitution or law of the United States, in all cases not provided for 111 these 
compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state. 
LC. 573-1 16. It is established that, "[alt common law there was no authority for the proposition 
that judicial decisions made law only for the future. Blackstone stated the rule that the duty of 
the court was not to 'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expouild the old one.' 1 
Blackstone, Coin~nentaries 69 (15th ed. 1809)." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 
(1965) (footnote omitted). When first enacted, 519-2719 included no language making plain any 
legislative intention to overturn the common law rule that new judicial decisions be applied 
retroactively. Nor did the statutory language admit of any other reasonable conclusion than that 
the legislature intended to overturn that common-law rule. Thus, the State's argun~ent hat $1 9- 
2719(5) does not allow successive post-conviction claims which rely on the retroactive 
application of new rules of decisional law fails. 
2. Elevating judicial efficiency over the retroactive application of Ring 
would eIevate judicial efficie~~cy over justice, which Sivak prohibits. 
Additionally, this Court has unambiguously held that successive post-conviction petitions 
litigating old claims 011 the basis of new information are permissible: "Applymg this rule as the 
State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence 
in successive post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been 
suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct. We must be vigilant against imposing a rule of law that 
will work ii~justice in the name ofjudicial efficiency." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 
(2000). Cf: Mahafey v. State, 87 Idaho 228,231,392 P.2d 279,281 (1964) ("111 the instant case 
... if we deny petitioner's application he will be in the unfortunate and medieval position of 
possessing a right for which there exists no remedy."). Ring was decided only shortly before Mr. 
Fields filed his successive petition. As the Court is aware, Ring overruled Walton v. Arizoiza, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990), which bad held that Arizona's sentencing scheme under which the 
sentencing judge determined the existence of death qualifying aggravating factor(s) was 
compatible with the Sixth Amendnlent. Since Petitioner's claims were based on information 
which could not reasoilably have been known at an earlier time since it did not exist at an earlier 
time, they met the Section 19-2719(5) exception. The State reads Sivak too narrowly, contending 
that the holding extends only to new evidence, as opposed to new law, because the Court's 
rationale was limited to actual innocence. Yet there is precious little in Sivak to support the 
State's view that this Court is willing to elevate judicial efficiency over justice in all cases except 
those where actual innocence is at issue. Mr. Fields was sentenced in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." Elevating judicial efficiency over the enforcement of a 
constitutional right adopted to protect the colnmunity as well as individual defendants from 
governmental abuse by guaranteeing juiy service to ordinary citizens would elevate efficiency 
over justice every bit as much as does elevating efficiency over the coi~sideration of new 
evidence of actual innocence. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406 (1991) (quoting Balzac v. 
Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922)). 
The State completely ignores the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee's critical 
commuility protection purpose, in favor of exclusively characterizing the guarantee as "merely 
a mechanism" and "a new technicality[.]" Respondent's Brief at 14. This mischaracterizatio~~ by
omission trivializes our constitutional rights into a collection of obstacles which should be 
extended to everyone other than criminal defendants -on the presumption that none of "us" will 
ever be "them." 
Perhaps recognizing that its reading of Section 19-2719 ignores established rules of 
statutory analysis and that its reading oESivak is unprincipled, the State asserts that, in Hogman 
v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 30, 121 P.3d 958, 961 (2005), the Court held that jury participation in 
sentencing claims earlier litigated may not be litigated in successive post-conviction proceedings. 
Here is the suin total of the H o f f a n  Court's Section 19-2719 analysis: 
"The State erroneously insists that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of 
death sentence eligibility is a new right. See Danfovth at 1035 & 1047 (every individual 
sentenced to death where a jury did not make the eligibility finding was sentenced illegally, 
regardless of whether they were sentenced before or after Ring was decided; decisions by this 
Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively do not imply that there was no right and thus 
110 violation of that right at the time of trial-only that no remedy will be provided; "would be 
quite wrong to assume, however, that the question whether constitutional violations occurred in 
trials conducted before a certain date depends on how much time was required to complete the 
appellate process"). 
The claims in Hoffman's Third Petition were clearly known and asserted in prior 
proceedings. . .Because this is a second successive post-conviction petition which 
does not fall within the exceptions ofthe statute, it is specifically barred by LC. 
519-2719. 
Id. a1 30, 961. The Hoffman court did no1 address the argument that Ring constituted new 
evidence in support of one or more old claims and that, therefore, the claims fell within the 
Section 19-2719(5) exception to the forty-two day liinitations period. H o f f u n  does not help the 
State. 
B. This Court's Precedent Requires Applying The Linkletter Test. 
The State makes two final arguments why new rules of law are not cognizable in 
successive post-conviction petitions. First, it contends, its position is bolstered by the Court 
never having applied the Linkletter test in a capital case and that, when confronted with 
retroactivity questions in successive capital post-conviction appeals, it has dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code Section 2719(5). Respondent's Brief at 14-19. Second, in 
the course of making its first argument, the State switches horses and argues that the Court has 
rejected the Linlcletter test. Respondent's Brief at 15-18, Each of these two arguments fails 
1. None of the cases relied on by the State support its position that the 
Court has implicitly applied Section 19-2719 to determine whether the 
question of retroactivity may properly be reached. 
As support for its first argument, the State contends that in Fetter@ v. State, I21 Idaho 
417, 825 P.2d 1073, reh 'g denied (1992), the Court excepted successive post-convictioll cases 
from the Linkletter test by "implicitly appl[ying] I.C. 519-2719 to address whether Idaho law 
permits the retroactive application of new rules of law raised in successive post-conviction 
petitions." Respondent's Brief at 15. It is important to note just what the State is and what it is 
not saying here at this point in its argument. It is not contending that the Court has adopted some 
other test to detennine whether a new rule should be retroactively applied to cases in a successive 
post-conviction posture. Rather, it claims that when confronted with a successive capital post- 
conviction petition appeal, the Court applies Section 19-2719(5) to detennine "whether Idaho 
law permits the retroactive application of new rules of law raised in successive post-convictioi~ 
petitions." Respondent's Brief at 14. It bears ernphasizirlg that the State is relying upon LC. 
519-2719(5), which does not provide an exception for the retroactive application of new iules of 
law[.]" Respondent's Brief at 18. 
Remarkably, the Fetterly rationale supplies no support whatsoever for the State's 
position: absent froin the Court's ailalysis is any reliance on the purported lack of a new rule of 
law exception to the single post-conviction petition rule of Section 19-2719(5). Far from 
avoiding the retroactivity question, the Cowl squarely identified and addressed it: "The real issue 
is whether Clzarboneau applies retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance .... 
[Tlhe Charboneau interpretation of LC. 5 19-2515 does not apply to the present case because the 
present case was final prior to the issuance of Clzarboneau." Fetterly at 418-19, 1074-75. 
Plainly, the Court held that the issue was whether Mr. Fetterly would be allowed the retroactive 
application of a new rule of law to support his cognizable claim, not whether Mr. Fetterly had 
stated a cognizable claim. The Court's negative answer sheds no light on whether the claim was 
cognizable in the first instance. If that issue was before the Court-and nothing in the Court's 
opinion suggests it was-it was left for another day. 
The structure of the State's argument-that this Court's oveiruling the application of the 
long established Linlcletter test to determine the retroactive effect of a new rule is revealed by a 
comparison between the majority opinion and Justice Bistline's dissent-makes little sense 
Silence cannot be equated with rejection. See supra at 5-6 and cases cited therein. Beyond the 
strnctnre of the State's argument, its substance is counter to this Court's holdings on stare 
decisis. Id. 
2. This Court has never rejected the Linkletter test. 
The State contends that the Court has implicitly held that the Linlcletter test is no longer 
Idaho law. For all the reasons set out supra at 4-1 1, the State's argument fails. 
C. To The Extent That Section 19-2719 Purports To Deny The Courts 
Jurisdiction To Entertain Successive Post-Conviction Claims Relying On The 
Retroactive Application Of New Decisional Rules Of Law, It Invades The 
Judiciary's Province, In Violation Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation 
Of Powers Requirement. 
Noting the Court's holding that the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus[,]" Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235,237,459 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1969), and that the 
legislature "may add to the efficacy of the writ[,]" Mahafey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 
280 (1964), the State asserts that "it naturally follows that I.C. $ 1  9-2719 does not unduly restrict 
the district court's jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." Respondent's 
Brief at 20. Missing from the State's argument is citation to any case holding or any reason to 
think that Section 19-2719' does in fact add to the efficacy of the writ. Removing from the courts 
jurisdiction to hear writs does not increase the effectiveness of the writ. But it does invade the 
power of the judiciary in violation of the constitutionally inandated separation of powers. See 
Opening Brief at 30-33 
The sole case relied on by the State and the court below for the opposite conclusion is 
Kirlcland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464,4 P.3d 11 15 (2000). There, the 
plaintiffs argued that a statute reducing damages allowed in tort actions by operation of law 
violated the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers doctrine because it "infringes on the 
inherent right of the courts to reduce jury verdicts in those instances where the evidence 
demonstrates the jury's verdict is excessive as a matter of law." Id. at 471, 1122.' Noting that 
none of the language in the statute at issue "purports to limit the exercise of the judiciary's 
co~lstitutional powers or jurisdiction[,]" the Court held that "the legislature . . . has the power to 
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of powers doctrine." Id., 
471, 1122. 
On the State's reading of Section 19-2719, and unlike the statute in Kii.klarzd, that statute 
lilllits the Court's jurisdiction to entertain successive capital post-conviction claims which rely on 
the retroactive application of new law. Kivkland is inapposite. 
Kivklalzd is inapposite for another reason as well. It nowhere addressed the interplay 
between the legislature's power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any constitutional 
rights vested in plaintiffs. Petitioner, on the other hand, is constitutionally guaranteed the right to 
seek a writ of habeas corpus, and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may now be sought 
exclusively illrough the vehicle of a post-conviction petition. This means that the legislature's 
prerogative to limit remedies in the post-conviction context is constrained by the constitutional 
prohibition against suspending the writ. Idaho Const. Art. 1 55 ("The privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in the case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it, and then only in such manner as shall be prescribed by law."). The fact that 
before Idaho Code Section 19-2719 was enacted, district courts reached the merits of habeas 
claims filed outside the time restrictions later imposed by that statute, demonstrates that the 
statute suspends the writ in violation of the constitutional guarantee. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 
228,229-30,392 P.2d 279-80 (1964) (reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas 
petition brought ten years after conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining 
purpose in enacting Section 19-2719 may have been permissible, its  chose^^ means violated the 
separation of powers constitutional requirement. 
D. The Legislature's Intent That Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) Be Applied 
Retroactively Is Irrelevant To Whether The Legislature Intended Section 19- 
2719(5) To Allow Successive Post-conviction Petitions Based On The 
Retroactive Application Of New Decisional Rules of Law. 
The State contends that because, when enactillg Idaho Code Section 19-2719 in 1984, the 
legislature expressed that the statute be retroactively applied, Section 19-2719 clearly applies to 
Petitioner's case. Mr. Fields agrees that that the legislature's statement in 1984 regarding 
Section 19-2719 means that that version of the statute applied retroactively. Cf: Idaho Code 
Section 73-101 (no statute may he retroactively applied absent an express legislative declaratioil 
to the contrary). However, for the reasons noted above and incorporated here by reference, 
there is no evidence that the legislature intended Section 19-2719(5) to prohibit successive post- 
conviction claims which rely on the retroactive application of new rules of decisional law. The 
available evidence suggests exactly the opposite. Id. 
E. Idaho Law Prohibits Retroactively Applying Idaho Code ~ec t iou  19- 
2719(5)0. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) provides that, "A successive post-conviction pleading 
asserting the exception shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive 
application of new rules of law." LC. $19-2719(5)(c). This provisioil was amended into the 
Idaho Code in 1.995. Petitioner's conviction was final prior to the enactment of Section 19- 
2719(5j(c). 
In Idaho, a new statute is not retroactive uilless the legislature expressly declares that the 
law should be applied retroactively. I.C. $ 73-101 ("No part of these compiled laws is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared."). "In the absence of a11 express declaration of 
legislative intent that a statute apply retroactively, it will not be so applied." Guiley v. .Jerome 
County, 113 Idaho 430,433,745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987); see Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 
230,234,526 P.2d 835, 839 (1974) ("No law in Idaho will be applied retroactively in the 
absence of a clear legislative illtent to that effect."). 
Even when an amendment is added to ail existing statute, the legislature must expressly 
declare that the amendment is to be retroactively applied. It is long settled that "that an 
amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the 
contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 
835 (1974)[.Iu Nebeker v. Pipe? Aircraft Corporation, 113 Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 
(1987)(citations omitted) (emphasis added). See Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430,433, 
745 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1987) (finding that an amendment was not retroactive because "it was not 
'expressly ... declared' in the statue that the amendment was to be retroactively applied"). 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c) contains no language stating that the amendment 
should be applied retroactively. When the legislature adopted the amended statute, it did not 
otherwise express any intention that the new law be applied retroactively. Therefore, Idaho Code 
Section 73-101 precludes the retroactive application of Section 19-2719(5) (c) to this case. 
The State counters that, when first creating Section 19-2719, the legislature included 
language malting it retroactively applicable. Respondent's Brief at 21. From this, the State 
concludes that subsection (5)(c), enacted over ten years later, is also retroactively applicable. But 
subsection (5)(c)'s enacting language does not meet this Court's clear requirement that if an 
amendment is to he retroactively applied, the legislature must provide "an expvess legislative 
statement." Nebeker, 113 Idaho at 614, 747 P.2d at 23. On the State's view, the legislature's 
silence is an implicit adoption of its earlier express language. Nebelcer nowhere suggests that 
silence may sometimes talce the place of an express statement. Further, the State's position 
requires reading ambiguity into an otherwise clear decision and, thus, invites muddying 
otherwise clear legislative waters. However, it is axiomatic that, "[wlhere the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court n~ust  give effect to the statute as written, without 
engaging in statutory construction. State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 
(1996). Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes that the legislature meant what is 
clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986)." 
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). 
Finally, absent a plainly expressed intent to the contrary, it stretches credulity to ascribe to 
individual legislators or a legislature an intent that some future law, the substance of which is 
entirely unknown, be retroactively applied. 
Retroactively applying Section 19-2719(5)(c) is prohibited by clear and settled Idaho law. 
Consequently, the State's argument, made in reliance on Section 19-2719(5)(c), that Mr. Fields' 
appeal be dismissed, fails. 
F. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) and Section 2719, I f  The  State's Reading 
O f  That Statute Is Correct, Violate Petitioner's Rights T o  Due Process And 
Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The  United States And Idaho 
Constitutions. 
The Opening Brief argues that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) violates his state and 
federal rights to equal protection and due process. Whereas Section 19-2719(5)(c) prohibits the 
retroactive applicatioii of new law in a successive capital post-conviction proceeding, no statute 
or state court decision contains a similar prohibition for non-capital successive post-conviction 
petitioners. Opening Brief at 33-36. In its answering brief, the State argues that Section 19- 
2719(5)(c) is immune to these challenges because Section 19-2719 has withstood process and 
equal protection challenges in the past. 
While the Opening Brief anticipated some of the State's arguments, it did not foresee the 
State's argument that Section 19-2719, rather than one of its subsections, precluded his claims as 
non-cogiiizable. He, therefore, now also argues that applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719 by 
itself to preclude his claims violates his state and federal rights to equal protection and due 
process. His argument is nearly identical to the one he has already made regarding Section 19- 
2719(5)(c). In particular, his due process and equal protection rights would be violated if Section 
19-2719 were applied to preclude the Idaho courts from reaching the merits of his jury trial as a 
fundamental right claims by either (1) extending that statute's 42-day limitations period to claims 
which did not exist within that period because, beyond the 42 day window, the United States 
Supre~ne Court reversed ail earlier ruling, thus breathing life into the previously dead claim, or 
(2) extending that 42-day limitations period to claims which did exist but for which additioiial 
supporting facts-here, the United States Supreme Court's ruling which reversed its earlier 
ruling-came to light outside that 42-day window. 
Critical to both sets of equal protection and due process claims-that is, to the Section 19- 
2719(5)(c) as well as the Section 19-2719 claims-is that, if the statute at issue were applied to 
block a merits review of his claims, it would infringe on the fundamental right to a jury trial, to 
fairness in the criminal process, and to fairness in procedures for enforcing claims concerning 
govemn~ental deprivations of life or liberty. Applying either of the statutes at issue to block a 
merits review of his clailns would violate the due process guarantee by infringing on those 
fundameiital rights without being narrowly tailored lo serve a coinpelling state interest. It would 
violate the equal protectioil guarantee by creating a classification anlong people or applying laws 
such that only some individuals would be able to exercise those fundamental rights, without 
being narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
The statute's stated purpose, to eliminate purportedly unnecessary delay in carrying out 
death sentences, is not a compelling state interest justifying the violation of Mr. Fields' 
fundamental rights. Further, even if eliminating alleged unnecessary delay were a compelling 
state interest, the statutes are not narrowly tailored. On the contrary, their design obviously 
allows for some petitioners to die and others to live based on a fortuity -the uncertain pace of 
litigation. As noted in his Opening Brief, Mr. Fields has been denied the benefit of Ring while 
this Court granted Ring sentencing relief to Mr. Fetterly, whose first degree murder prosecutioii 
was commenced six years before Mr. Fields' was. 
Tile State answers, first, by citing State v. Beanz, 115 Idaho 208, 211-13, 766 P.2d 678, 
681-83 (1988), for the proposition that "the court [sic] expressly held I.C. g19-2719 does not 
violate equal protection." Respondent's Brief at 22. It then cites to State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665, 676 (1991), noting that, there, "lhe court [sic] expressly concluded I.C. 
919-2719 does not violate due process." Respondent's Brief at 22. Finally, the State cites to 
seven of this Court's decisions affiilning Beanz andlor Rhoade~. '~  
The fundamental rights based equal protection and due process attacks on Sections 19- 
2719 and 19-2719(5)(c) raise issues of first impression for this Court. The State's answer 
regarding equal protection and due process fails because none of the cases on which it relies and 
no other decision from this Court's addresses equal protection or due process claims where a 
fundamental right is at stake. Instead, in Beam the Court only confronted whether the difference 
between the limitations periods for filing a petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (five years) versus under the Section 19-2719 (forty-two days) creates a 
classification which violates the equal protection guarantee by having no rational relationship to 
a legitimate govemnental purpose. Beam, 115 Idaho at 21 1-214, 766 P.2d at 681-684. The 
Court held that it did not 
We hold that the legislature's determination that it was necessary to reduce the 
interminable delay in capital cases is a rational basis for the imposition of the 
42-day time limit set for I.C. 9 19-2719. The legislature has identified the 
problem and attempted to remedy it with a statutory scheme that is rationally 
"Those cases are Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 55, 156 P.3d 552 (2007), remanded on 
other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008); Lanlford v. State, 127 
Idaho 100, 102,897 P.2d 991,993 (1995); State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638,647, 851 P.2d 934 
(1993); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,430-31,825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Rlzoades, 121 Idaho 
63,72,822 P.2d 960,969, second reh g denied (1992); Paz v. State, 118 Idaho 542,559,798 
P.2d 1, 18 (1990); and State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 23 1,235-36,766 P.2d 701 (1988). 
related to the legitimate legislative purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed 
sentences. Accordingly, LC. 5 19-2719 does not violate the defcndant's 
constitutional right to equal protection, and the trial couit correctly denied Beam's 
post conviction petition. 
Beam at 213, 683. The shorter time allottedcapital defendants to file upheld by Beam was not a 
fundame~ltal right. In none of the other cases cited by the State nor in any other case has this 
Court confronted whether the classification violates the equal protection guarantee where a 
fundamental right is at stake. 
Similarly, in Rhoades the Court cotlfronted whether the 42-day limitations period for 
filing a post-conviction petition in capital cases violates the due process guarantee. The Court 
held that it did not. 
Therefore we hold that LC. 5 19-2719 provides a defendant one opportunity to 
raise all challenges to the coliviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction 
relief except in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues 
raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within the time 
frame allowed by the statute. The legislature has seen fit to appropriately limit 
the time frame within which to bring challenges which are known or which 
reasonably should be known. The process enconlpassed in LC. 5 19-271 9 
providing for review by the trial couit and then this Court, provides adequate 
opportunity to present the issues raised and to have them adequately reviewed. 
Therefore, I.C. 5 19-2719 is not unconstitutional under due process analysis. 
Rhoades 120 Idaho at 808, 820 P.2d at 678. In none of the other cases cited by the State nor in 
any other case has this Court addressed whether the limitations period violates the due process 
guarantee when a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial is at stake 
Where fundamental rights are at stake, "strict scrutiny" is the proper standard of review. 
Put differently, the due process inquiry is whether the restriction on the exercise of the 
fundamental right is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The equal protection 
inquiry is whether the classification or application of laws such that only some individuals may 
exercise the fundamei~tal right at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
The State has identified no compelling state interest in its answering brief. Nor has it proffered 
any explanation for how the 42-day limitation period collstitutes narrow tailoring in furtherance 
of any legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise. Even supposing, for the sake of 
argument, that some compelling state interest could be served by the 42-day limitations period, 
applying that limitation to prohibit the retroactive applicatio~l of fuildainental rights will-and 
indeed, has-resulted in extraordinarily u~~equal  dispositions. As noted above, this Court granted 
Ring sentencing relief to Mr. Fetterly, whose prosecution coinmeliced four years before the 
prosecution against Mr. Fields was started. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and for all the reasons in the Opetling Brief, the Court should remand 
this case for resentencing consistent with the principles announced in Ring v. Arizona.. 
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